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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BARRIERS TO MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINE: CULTURAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
ELIZABETH CHIARELLO*
ABSTRACT
Medical boards are responsible for disciplining physicians who inflict
egregious harm on their patients, yet they often fail to do so. This Article
develops a cultural and organizational framework for explaining why boards so
often fail to discipline physicians. The framework highlights three types of
barriers that impede board action: (1) input barriers that prevent hospitals and
clinics from reporting harm to boards, (2) processing barriers that prevent
boards from taking sufficient action against physicians who do harm, and (3)
output barriers that prevent boards from sharing information about physicians
who do harm with other disciplinary agencies like other medical boards and law
enforcement. The Article demonstrates how the interplay between these barriers
reduces the likelihood that boards will discipline physicians who harm patients
and also shows how boards behave like other kinds of organizations in similar
situations. The Article concludes with a set of solutions to overcoming each type
of barrier and explains why an organizational and cultural perspective is
essential for identifying gaps between boards’ stated goals and their actions and
for developing effective solutions.

* Elizabeth Chiarello, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology &
Anthropology, Saint Louis University. The author thanks Elizabeth Pendo for the invitation to
contribute to this Issue and the Staff and Editorial Board of Volume 15 of the Journal of Health
Law and Policy for their editorial assistance. She is grateful to Fran Berman, Anne Higonnet, Ruth
Horowitz, and Alexandra Lahav for comments on earlier drafts. She also thanks Maddie Baumgart,
Amogh Chariyamane, Abby Lawrence, and Cameron Wolfram for research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sociologist Ruth Horowitz spent fifteen years as a public member on two
state medical boards (SMBs) in the 1980s and 1990s. 1 As one of a handful of
non-physicians, she brought unique perspectives to the board—that of a member
of the public with no investment in helping physicians protect themselves, and
that of a sociologist with extensive training in observing social phenomena. 2
What Horowitz discovered was shocking. As detailed in her book In the Public
Interest, she found that even though medical boards began to include public
members in the 1960s, today’s public members struggle to get their voices heard
and have difficultly acting on the public’s behalf. 3 Horowitz demonstrates deep
divisions between boards’ stated goals of acting in the public interest and their
actions that too often undermine that goal. 4
Three decades later, Tristan McIntosh, Elizabeth Pendo, and their colleagues
set out on a different mission. 5 Their goal was to uncover “particularly effective
practices, resources, and statutory provisions that SMBs and policymakers can
adopt to better protect patients from egregious wrongdoing by physicians.” 6
They convened a modified Delphi panel composed of physicians, executive
members, legal counsel, and public members of around half of U.S. medical
boards. 7 What Pendo and her colleagues found was also shocking: not only did
medical boards vary significantly in the frequency and severity of the
disciplinary actions they imposed, but they overwhelmingly failed to act even in
cases of egregious harm. 8 They show us what boards are doing wrong and
describe what they should do about it. 9
Taken together, Horowitz and McIntosh et al. offer two of the few glimpses
we have into the innerworkings of professional medical boards—a critical, but
underexamined, aspect of administrative law. 10 Horowitz offers a micro-level

1. RUTH HOROWITZ, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: MEDICAL LICENSING AND THE
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 4 (Rima D. Apple & Janet Golden eds., 2012).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 173.
5. See generally Elizabeth Pendo et al., Protecting Patients from Physicians Who Inflict
Harm: New Legal Resources for State Medical Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 7
(2022); Tristan McIntosh et al., Protecting Patients from Egregious Wrongdoing by Physicians:
Consensus Recommendations from State Medical Board Members and Staff, J. MED. REGUL., Oct.
2021, at 5–18.
6. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 15; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5.
7. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 6.
8. Id. at 5–6; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13–14.
9. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 14; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–16.
10. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 1–9; see generally McIntosh et al., supra note 5; James M.
DuBois et al., Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine: A Statistical and Ethical Analysis of 280
Cases in the United States from 2008–2016, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2019, at 16–34 (2019); James
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perspective that delves into the daily grind of board work by detailing how board
members make decisions and the consequences of those decisions for patient
care. 11 McIntosh et al. offer a macro-level perspective of those decisions and
categorize boards’ responses to bad behavior. 12
Professional boards serve an important purpose. These administrative
agencies protect the public by educating, licensing, and disciplining
professionals. However, boards also represent a regulatory bargain that
professionals have struck with the state. The state relinquishes control over
professions and provides them the autonomy to regulate themselves as long as
they promise to behave in ways that benefit the public. Horowitz and McIntosh
et al. investigate whether boards uphold their end of the bargain. 13 Do they really
operate in the public interest? Beyond medical boards’ successes and failures,
Horowitz and McIntosh et al. help us to understand something critical about the
intersection between law and medicine. Boards make promises that they do not
always keep, especially when they fail to regulate their licensees. 14
A brief note on why medical boards are included under the term
“administrative law”: unlike lawyers who have a single type of organization—
the bar association—that is responsible for advocating for the profession and
disciplining professionals, 15 medicine and other health care professions like
nursing and pharmacy have two types of organizations. They have (1)
professional associations like the American Medical Association (AMA) and
state medical associations that advocate for the profession, and (2) state medical
boards that license and discipline providers. 16 These boards are part of the state
apparatus and are governed by administrative law in the form of medical,
nursing, and pharmacy practice acts that determine the kinds of decisions boards
can make and how they can make them. Therefore, unlike bar associations,
medical boards are governed by administrative law.
I am a medical sociologist and a socio-legal scholar who has conducted
research on various types of boards for the last fifteen years. 17 As part of my
research, I have interviewed board executives, board members, board
M. DuBois et al., Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians: A Mixed-Methods, Exploratory
Analysis of 101 Cases, 31 SEXUAL ABUSE 503, 503–23 (2019).
11. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 2, 115, 141, 175.
12. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 6–16.
13. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 1–9; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
14. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 2–5, 54.
15. See, e.g., Center for Professional Responsibility, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2020) (“The Center for Professional
Responsibility advances the public interest by promoting and encouraging high ethical conduct and
professionalism by lawyers and judges.”).
16. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 51, 92.
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chiarello, Challenging Professional Self-Regulation: Social
Movement Influence on Pharmacy Rulemaking in Washington State, 38 WORK & OCCUPATIONS
303, 303–04 (2011).
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investigators, expert witnesses, and lawyers who defend professionals in board
proceedings. 18 Boards wield considerable power over professional practice, yet
they often do not behave in the ways we might expect. 19 The public knows so
little about boards that they are rarely a topic of conversation, especially in law
and the social sciences, which is why the topic of this symposium is so
important.
In the piece that catalyzed this symposium, McIntosh and her colleagues ask
a critically important question: If medical boards are designed to protect the
public from physician harm, why do they so often fail? 20 McIntosh et al.
eliminate a number of ethical gray areas by focusing on egregious harm, such as
sexual assault, opioid overprescribing, and fraudulent surgeries. 21 Though
boards should be highly motivated to address these acute dangers, they
overwhelmingly fail to act. 22 Each year, only 0.1% of all licensed physicians
face disciplinary action that involves the most severe forms of punishment such
as license suspension, surrender, or revocation. 23 Because of lax enforcement,
many physicians harm their patients and face no consequences. We now have to
deal with a mismatch between a board’s mission to act in the public interest and
a board’s action, or more accurately inaction, to punish physicians who do
harm. 24
From a formal legal perspective, board inaction is surprising. If a board is
legally designed to act, why does it not? To this legal question, Pendo et al.
provide the answer with their cornerstone piece in this Issue. They unveil the
professional bind in which boards’ members find themselves—motivated to act
but lacking the resources necessary to do so. 25 If, however, we move from the
formal legal perspective to a sociological one, board inaction is not so
surprising. 26 Boards, and the hospitals and clinics that report to them, engage in
common organizational and economic practices—they protect their members

18. Id. at 315–16; Elizabeth Chiarello, National Science Foundation Award No. 1753308, The
Influence of Social Problems on Healthcare and Legal Institutions, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (May 1,
2018), https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1753308 [hereinafter NSF
Award No. 1753308].
19. Chiarello, supra note 17, at 328; HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 53–54.
20. See generally McIntosh et al., supra note 5 (implicitly addressing reasons why SMBs often
fail to protect the public from physician harm).
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5–6; HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 4–196.
25. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5, 15.
26. Elizabeth Chiarello & Calvin Morrill, A Multi-Field Logics Approach to Theorizing
Relationships Between Healthcare and Criminal Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES OF MEDICINE AND HEALTH 152, 160 (Marie-Andrée Jacob and Anna Kirkland
eds., 2020).
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and prioritize organizational survival. 27 For board behavior to change, their
cultural and legal contexts must change as well.
This Article develops a cultural and organizational framework to illuminate
why boards fail to protect the public from egregious harm. Sociological, sociolegal, and organizational theories are used to explain factors that shape the social
context in which boards act or fail to act. I draw examples from a wide range of
organizations, from universities 28 to the Catholic Church, 29 to explain the
mechanisms that shape board behavior. I also draw on my own empirical
research on boards to highlight key ideas, though I do not provide a systematic
analysis of those data. 30 I conclude by providing a set of recommendations for
how to interrupt processes that do not serve the public and how to reorient boards
away from self-protection and towards patient-protection. After all, public
protection is a board’s core mission. 31 Before building this cultural and
organizational framework, I begin by offering some background on boards, how
they operate, and how they are described in literature on the professions. Note
that even though boards vary significantly across states, here I discuss boards in
general instead of delving into those differences.
II. BACKGROUND
The history of the professions is a story of power and competition. 32 Selfregulation is a mechanism that professions have used to carve out exclusive
jurisdictions and to protect themselves from competitors and from state

27. See, e.g., Laura L. Dunn, Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring
Compliance with the Clery Act, Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 564–71 (2013);
PATRICIA EWICK & MARC W. STEINBERG, BEYOND BETRAYAL: THE PRIEST SEX ABUSE CRISIS,
THE VOICE OF THE FAITHFUL, AND THE PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 7–8 (Doug Mitchell &
Elizabeth B. Dyson eds., 2019); JENNIFER S. HIRSCH & SHAMUS KHAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: A
LANDMARK STUDY OF SEX, POWER, AND ASSAULT ON CAMPUS 201–02 (Jodi Beder ed., 2020);
Chrysanthi S. Leon, Law, Mansplainin’, and Myth Accommodation in Campus Sexual Assault
Reform, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 987, 990–91, 1021–22 (2015); W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F.
DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZING: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS
PERSPECTIVES 4, 162, 324 (Pearson Educ., Inc. 2007).
28. Dunn, supra note 27, at 564; Leon, supra note 27, at 989–90.
29. EWICK & STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 47, 103, 109.
30. NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
31. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 64.
32. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM, THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF
KNOWLEDGE 13, 93 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 83 (Atherton Press 1970); MAGALI SARFATTI
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS x (Grant Barnes & Gene
Tanke eds., 1979); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE
RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 4 (2nd ed. Basic
Books 2017) (1982).
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regulation. 33 The medical profession is the quintessential example of successful
jurisdictional control, 34 even though some of that control has eroded in the past
few decades. 35
In this Part, I unpack the history of the professions and the history of
professional boards. First, I describe the process by which professions achieve
“closure” or exclusive control over designated knowledge and tasks. 36 Then, I
highlight how medical boards began to look the way they do today, with a
specific focus on the board’s commitment to act in the public interest. In
particular, I discuss how including public members on medical boards is
designed to help the board serve the public interest. 37 It does not always work.
The history of medical boards raises the question of whether boards were ever
intended to protect the public interest, or if the “public interest” was a rhetorical
strategy to help physicians achieve closure and ward off competitors. 38
A.

Professional Closure

To understand how professions gain and maintain power, it is useful to avoid
thinking about professions in isolation and instead to think about them as a
“system of professions” organized around types of knowledge and tasks over
which they have staked control. 39 To paint a few of the health care professions
with a very broad brush, physicians diagnose diseases and prescribe remedies,
nurses administer treatment, and pharmacists dispense medications.40 These
tasks—diagnosing, prescribing, administering, and dispensing—belong to these
professions’ jurisdictions, or bodies of knowledge and sets of tasks recognized
by others as belonging primarily or exclusively to a particular profession. 41
Sociology of the professions offers robust theories about the processes that
establish jurisdictional boundaries and the processes that provoke change. 42 One
33. PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE, supra note 32,
at 84; LARSON, supra note 32, at x, 9.
34. PROFESSIONALISM, THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32,
at 154, 158; LARSON, supra note 32, at 12.
35. Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963,
963–65, 969 (1980); W. RICHARD SCOTT ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS: FROM PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE TO MANAGED CARE 58, 61, 95 (2000).
36. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 21 (1988); PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL
CARE, supra note 32, at 99–100; LARSON, supra note 32, at 131.
37. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 5–6.
38. Id. at 3–4.
39. ABBOTT, supra note 36, at 21–22.
40. Id. at 173, 249.
41. Id. at 77, 117–18.
42. Id. at 22; PROFESSIONALISM, THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 32, at 158; PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE,
supra note 32, at 95; LARSON, supra note 32, at 5.
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might ask why registered nurses, who have extensive patient experience, cannot
diagnose, or why pharmacists, who have six years of training including clinical
rotations, cannot prescribe. 43 The answer has far less to do with the knowledge
or skills of any particular professional group and far more to do with the
mechanisms by which professions seize control of jurisdictions and ward off
competitors. 44
In his landmark book The System of the Professions, sociologist Andrew
Abbott theorizes a set of six “settlements” that result from competition over
jurisdictions: (1) one profession can claim the full jurisdiction, (2) one
profession can be subordinated under the other, (3) professions can split the
jurisdiction into two parts, (4) professions can share a jurisdiction, (5) one
profession can advise another on certain tasks, or (6) professions can divide
work based on type of clients. 45 However, even gaining professional status is a
feat in itself. 46 Fundamentally, professions are interested in achieving
“closure.” 47 That is, they want to be recognized as professionals with their own
exclusive domain of knowledge and tasks, and they want to defend that domain,
or jurisdiction, from would-be competitors. 48 This is what sociologist Magali
Sarfatti Larson calls a “professional project,” or an effort to claim high social
status and agency over one’s work while being free from intrusion by others. 49
State support is crucial for legitimizing this professional project. 50 States
provide professions with a way to defend themselves from would-be competitors
by legally allocating certain tasks to them and denying those tasks to others. 51
Two forms of state legitimation help professions to secure their jurisdictions:
licensure and self-regulation. 52 Licensure helps to limit which workers can
perform a specific task. 53 For example, in most states, a barber cannot perform

43. RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 84–
86 (2nd ed. 1997); GREGORY L. WEISS & LYNNE E. LONNQUIST, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH,
HEALING, AND ILLNESS 302 (8th ed. Routledge 2014).
44. ABBOTT, supra note 36, at 22, 135; ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 337 (1st ed. 1970); LARSON, supra note 32,
at 10, 12; STARR, supra note 32, at 229–31.
45. ABBOTT, supra note 36, at 145.
46. PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE, supra note 32,
at 81; LARSON, supra note 32, at 12.
47. Kim A. Weeden, Why Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others? Social Closure and
Earnings Inequality in the United States, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 55, 61–92 (2002).
48. Id. at 70.
49. LARSON, supra note 32, at 51.
50. Id. at 14.
51. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 40–46.
52. PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE, supra note 32,
at 83; HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 46–48; LARSON, supra note 32, at 129.
53. PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 44, at 21, 187.
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surgery, a teacher cannot cut hair, and a waiter cannot give a massage without a
medical license, 54 a cosmetology license, 55 or a massage license, respectively. 56
Licensure benefits professions because it limits the number of people who can
perform a task and, as a result, reduces competition and keeps wages high. 57
Licensure is also an aspect of self-regulation. One goal of the professional
project is to achieve autonomy from the state. 58 As part of their broad police
power, states control all aspects of work that are not constitutionally allocated
to the federal government. 59 However, professions want to seize control from
the state so the profession has exclusive power over its jurisdiction. 60
Professions do so by striking a regulatory bargain with the state, of which boards
and the promise to act in “the public interest” are crucial elements. 61
B.

The Function of Medical Boards

Boards are regulatory agencies born out of professional quests for power.
When medical boards were first developed, the medical profession bore little
resemblance to the medical profession of today. 62 Before 1910, physicians did
not enjoy elevated status over other health care professionals. 63 Instead, they
were on par with pharmacists, nurses, midwives, and chiropractors, and there
was a great deal of variation among physicians in terms of how they were
trained, the techniques they used, and how much they charged. 64 That all
changed when the Carnegie Foundation commissioned a team to evaluate the
quality of medical schools. 65 Following on the heels of the AMA’s licensing
changes in 1906, the Flexner Report, published in 1910, evaluated which
medical schools met the new requirements and found many of them severely
lacking. Flexner’s detailed and biting report precipitated a wave of medical
school closings through 1920. 66 Still, physicians were wary of other professions
54. Obtaining a Medical License, AM. MED. ASS’N (May 15, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.
org/residents-students/career-planning-resource/obtaining-medical-license.
55. State Requirements for Cosmetologists, NATL. ASS’N COMPLEMENTARY & ALT. MEDS.,
https://nacams.org/cosmetology-states/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021).
56. Massage Therapist License Requirements by State, MASSAGE MAG. INS. PLUS,
https://www.massageliabilityinsurancegroup.com/state-requirements/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021).
57. STARR, supra note 32, at 102, 230.
58. LARSON, supra note 32, at 184.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
60. PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 44, at 72; PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE,
supra note 32, at 83; LARSON, supra note 32, at 184–85.
61. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 33, 44.
62. Id. at 34; STARR, supra note 32, at 24–25.
63. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 35–36; STARR, supra note 32, at 82.
64. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 35; STARR, supra note 32, at 81.
65. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 50; STARR, supra note 32, at 118.
66. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 50–51; STARR, supra note 32, at 118.
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who might challenge them for control over emerging medical tasks. So,
physicians struck a regulatory bargain with the state: the state would grant
physicians sole control over a subset of tasks and give them the autonomy to
decide how to practice medicine. 67 In exchange, physicians would promise to
regulate themselves in ways that protected the public interest. 68 That is the
model on which boards are predicated today.
The irony is that physicians established boards at a time when many medical
remedies lacked a sufficient basis in scientific evidence and sometimes harmed
patients. 69 Medical boards, whose stated aim was to protect the public, were also
closely aligned with medical associations like the AMA, whose aim was to
protect the profession. 70 Horowitz observes, “it was difficult to pass public
interest legislation when the medical society and boards were so closely
aligned.” 71 Additionally, boards and associations worked collaboratively to keep
evidence of physician wrongdoing out of the public eye as negative public
opinion would threaten the creation and power of these emerging professional
entities. For example, professional codes deterred physicians from reporting and
testifying against their colleagues. Physicians who dared to do so faced harsh
consequences. 72
For example, in the 1950s, one Illinois physician who cooperated with the
state’s attorney general to identify problematic practitioners found himself
excluded from the profession. 73 When he attempted to practice in Arizona
instead, his reputation followed him there as the Illinois board shared his
offenses with the Arizona board. 74 A letter from the Illinois Attorney General
was no help, and the physician was unable to practice until nine years later, when
a court saw through the political smokescreen and required the board to license
him. 75 This doctor’s case left one to wonder: How could physicians uphold the
highest ethical standards if they were prohibited from holding one another
accountable? This got critics thinking that perhaps boards comprised entirely of
physicians were ill-equipped to protect the public. 76 Maybe they lacked the
neutrality necessary to uphold the standards they had set for themselves. 77
67. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 42–44; STARR, supra note 32, at 141.
68. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 47; STARR, supra note 32, at 144.
69. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 35; David Johnson & Humayun J. Chaudhry, The History of
the Federation of State Medical Boards: Part One—19th Century Origins of FSMB and Modern
Medical Regulation, J. MED. REGUL., Mar. 2012, at 20, 24; STARR, supra note 32, at 138.
70. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 33, 89.
71. Id. at 70.
72. Id. at 54; Johnson & Chaudhry, supra note 69, at 21.
73. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 54.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 56; BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND PUBLIC POLICY:
FINAL REPORT 10 (1972).
77. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 55–56.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

64

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:55

Perhaps boards needed input from those with no connection to the medical
profession. 78 These concerns fueled the push to add public members to medical
boards, a move that boards and associations vehemently opposed. 79
C. The Role of the Public Member
Boards promised to act in the public interest, but board members were
convinced that only they had the knowledge and skill to determine what the
public interest was. 80 Two paternalistic ideas legitimated self-regulation, both of
which centered on the public’s ignorance: (1) the idea that physicians knew best
how to protect the public, and (2) the idea that the public could not evaluate
physician behavior for disciplinary purposes. 81 Certainly, patients could not
differentiate between good medicine and bad—they had neither the knowledge
nor the skills. Therefore, board members argued that patients should trust
medical boards to regulate board members and their physician colleagues and to
hold themselves to the highest possible ethical standards. 82 In their view, the
idea of public members on boards was equally preposterous—members of the
public could not possibly hope to understand the deep technical challenges that
physicians faced and could not render a verdict on whether a physician’s actions
met professional standards. 83 This claim ignored the fact that many cases
brought before medical boards were issues of ethics or access that did not require
specialized knowledge. 84
These twin notions helped physicians ward off public intervention for
decades. However, these claims began to lose leverage in the 1960s and 1970s
when political and cultural movements ushered in mobilization for consumer
rights and a deep distrust of authority. 85 In the throes of this cultural melee,
critics of professional boards began to insist that boards should include members
of the public in their ranks. 86 Boards and professional organizations like the
AMA initially resisted—they remained unconvinced that public members could
adequately evaluate the quality of medical practice and feared that public
intrusion onto boards would threaten the board’s power to self-regulate. 87
Boards that allowed public members in the early days either kept them away
from important board business or did not permit them to vote, leading many

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 56, 62.
Id. at 48, 62.
Id. at 48.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 47–48.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 56. See generally SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 9; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76, at 264.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 33.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

BARRIERS TO MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINE

65

public members to quit or disengage. However, after years of conflict, boards
eventually grew to accept public members . . . to a degree. 88
Board members began to see that including public members helped them
solve a growing problem of legitimacy without actually threatening status quo
board operations. 89 At the time, boards were seen as self-interested, self-serving
bodies who were more interested in protecting their power and pocketbooks than
in actually serving the public. 90 This public perception threw boards into a crisis
of legitimacy in which they feared that if critics grew loud and powerful enough,
state legislatures would take action that would compromise boards’ ability to
self-govern. 91 Allowing public members on boards helped to quell the critics. 92
When public members signed off on board decisions, they indicated that the
interests of the boards and the public were aligned. 93 However, there were not
enough public members on any board to actually transform board decisions or
the mechanisms by which those decisions were made. 94 This resulted in public
members acting as a sort of symbolic window dressing that legitimated board
actions without catalyzing change. 95
Not only was admitting public members a symbolic act, but boards and
professional associations went to great lengths to shield physicians from scrutiny
by the public members, hiding some of the worst offenders in physician health
programs (PHPs, sometimes referred to as impaired physician programs). PHPs
are programs run by professional associations to help physicians who have
impairments such as substance use disorders or who engage in sexual
misconduct. 96 Decisions to send physicians to PHPs were made in secret; board
members were not to know if physicians were participating in PHPs and were to
trust the association to determine whether the provider had been rehabilitated. 97
Patients, too, were none the wiser, and if the association allowed it, physicians
who had sexually assaulted patients or had stolen patients’ pain medication
continued to provide care. 98 The AMA created a model Disabled Physician Act
in 1974 that enabled PHPs’ creation based on the idea that “impaired physicians
needed effective rehabilitation, not punishment.” 99

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 69, 98.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 24, 61.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 64.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 86, 100.
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 66–67.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 66.
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Framing board formation and licensure in terms of public interest resolved
tension between patient choice and professional closure. 100 Public interest
rhetoric pushed toward the latter by aligning the public’s interest in safety with
the profession’s interest in power and prestige. 101 The argument went that
patients deserved protection and would only receive it if the state allowed the
medical profession to regulate itself and weed out negligent or nefarious
practitioners. 102 The problem is that boards never did, 103 at least not to the extent
that would have achieved real public protection. 104 Instead, boards used
licensure as a cudgel to ward off would-be competitors and restrict medical
practice to a privileged few. 105 Adding public members did little to shift board
operations. Instead, it merely helped to dispel the public perception that
physicians acted exclusively in their own interest. 106 Horowitz bluntly describes
how self-regulation, boards, and licensure protected physicians when she states
“[t]he medical profession had used its power to corner the market, jack up its
status, and control peoples’ bodies and lives.” 107
Fast forward to today. Physicians still self-regulate. All states have medical
boards, and most boards have public members. 108 These boards claim that they
act in the public interest, but evidence suggests that they often do not. 109 The
number of physicians disciplined is far fewer than the number who commit
egregious harm, and those that are disciplined often receive minimal
rehabilitation before returning to work with the public. 110 The history of boards
helps to partly explain why boards fail to fulfill their stated aim. 111 However, for

100. Id. at 68.
101. Id. at 7.
102. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 5.
103. Id. at 5, 116.
104. Id. at 116.
105. Id. at 75.
106. Id. at 64–65.
107. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 65.
108. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., BOARD MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION 1 (2021),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/regulatory/board-structure/board-membership-compo
sition.pdf.
109. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 32–34; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6; Pendo et al.,
supra note 5, at 13.
110. Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine, supra note 10, at 16–17; Sexual Violation of
Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 506; Ariel Hart, Doctors & Sex Abuse: Accused Doctors
Go to Therapy, Then Return to Practice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., http://doctors.ajc.com/sex_abuse_
treatment_over_punishment/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021); Carrie Teegardin & Danny Robbins, Still
Forgiven: The #MeToo Movement and Public Outcry over Dr. Larry Nassar’s Sex Abuse Have Not
Reformed the System that Disciplines Doctors, ATLANTA J.-CONST., https://doctors.ajc.com/
still_forgiven/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021); McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6; Pendo et al., supra
note 5, at 13.
111. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 180; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76, at 357.
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a more robust explanation, we must also dive into sociological research on
culture and organizations.
III. A CULTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Board members make decisions about physician misconduct in a cultural
and organizational environment characterized by particular norms, values,
processes, and power dynamics. 112 Attending to key mechanisms at work in
these environments helps to explain why boards behave the way they do. I
propose that to understand boards’ behavior, we need to consider three types of
barriers to physician discipline: (1) input barriers, (2) processing barriers, and
(3) output barriers, as well as aspects of the cultural and organizational context
in which these barriers manifest.
A.

Input Barriers

Input barriers are those barriers that prevent information about egregious
misconduct from reaching the board. One major reason that boards do not
discipline physicians who inflict egregious harm is because boards never hear
about it. 113 Boards are generally reactive rather than proactive. They act on tips
that they receive from families, practitioners, other agencies, or concerned
citizens instead of seeking out cases on their own. 114 Hospitals and clinics are
legally required to report physician misconduct to boards, yet many either do
not report or report information that is so vague that boards cannot even
understand what happened, let alone act on it. 115 What prevents hospitals,
clinics, patients, and families from reporting egregious misconduct to boards and
why do hospitals and clinics that do report do so in a way that is difficult for
boards to interpret? I argue that hospitals and clinics have different motivations
for failing to report than patients and families, so I analyze these groups
separately.
Research suggests that there are four main reasons that hospitals and clinics
fail to report: (1) doing so could hurt them reputationally and financially, (2)

112. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 147, 157
(1983); ROGER FRIEDLAND & ROBERT R. ALFORD, BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN: SYMBOLS,
PRACTICES, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 243–44, 253 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds.,
1991); SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 277.
113. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13.
114. Elizabeth Chiarello, L. & Soc’y Ass’n Ann. Meeting, White Coat Crime: Regulatory and
Criminal Investigations of Prescription Drug Diversion by Healthcare Professionals 10, 14 (2019)
(on file with author).
115. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 28.
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there are no consequences for failing to report, (3) organizations in general often
fail to hold their members accountable, and (4) many patients do not report. 116
1. Preventing Reputational and Financial Harm
First, organizations, like people, have a survival instinct, so they resist taking
action that could threaten their survival. 117 Hospitals and clinics rely on public
trust to stay in business, and, in places where competition is fierce, any inklings
of misconduct could repel patients and motivate them to seek care somewhere
else. 118 Reporting physicians to the board creates opportunities for negative
press coverage and raises questions about how administrators could have
allowed this to happen, which undermines public trust and threatens the hospital
or clinic’s reputation and bottom line. 119
Hospitals and clinics must balance concerns about finances and reputation
with a legal duty to report. 120 They thread the needle by reporting in ways that
make it difficult for boards (and journalists) to assess what went wrong. 121 By
doing so, they fulfill their legal obligations without putting themselves at risk.
From a socio-legal standpoint, we can think of this as “[p]laying with the [l]aw,”
treating law as a game and engaging in moves that allow the organization to
emerge victorious within the confines of the law. 122 Even as they skirt the letter
of the law, organizations that take this approach arguably behave more
responsibly than those that fail to report at all.
2.

No Consequences for Failing to Report

Second, many hospitals and clinics do not report misconduct to the board
because they realize that there are no consequences for failing to report. 123 This
demonstrates what socio-legal scholars call a gap between the “law on the
books” and the “law in action.” 124 There is a legal requirement to report and yet
very few reports are made. 125 But what explains this gap is the fact that hospitals
116. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13, 28–29.
117. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 61, 252.
118. Suzanne C. Makarem & Mona Al-Amin, Beyond the Service Process: The Effects of
Organizational and Market Factors on Customer Perceptions of Health Care Services, 17 J. SERV.
RSCH. 399, 400, 411–12 (2014).
119. See generally M.L. Millenson, Pushing the Profession: How the News Media Turned
Patient Safety into a Priority, 11 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 57, 60 (2002).
120. Makarem & Al-Amin, supra note 118, at 400; see also Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 28–
29.
121. Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
122. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE 129, 131 (William O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1998).
123. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 29.
124. Austin Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate
Persistence of a Research Tradition, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 23, 23 (1985).
125. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 28.
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and clinics face harm when they do report but face none when they do not. 126
Given this set of perverse incentives, it is no surprise that hospitals and clinics
fail to report, or that some skirt the line by giving boards enough information to
meet the legal requirement but not enough to investigate.
3. Organizations Protect Their Own
Third, organizations generally fail to hold their members accountable and
tend to protect their members from consequences, particularly when it comes to
sexual offenses—some of the most egregious harms that physicians can
perpetuate. 127 We live in a society in which sexual harassment and sexual assault
are rampant, and yet perpetrators of sexual offenses are rarely punished. 128
About sixteen percent of American women and three percent of American
men are sexually assaulted in their lifetime, and yet only thirty-one percent of
sexual assaults are reported to the police. 129 Of those reported, only sixteen
percent lead to an arrest, nine percent lead to a felony conviction, and eight
percent of perpetrators serve time. 130 Add to that the fact that people who report
sexual assault face the possibility that they will not be believed, and that some
police departments make it a habit to investigate people who report for “false
complaints,” it is no surprise that sexual assault is so heavily underreported in
this country. 131
Now, consider assault in the context of the physician-patient relationship,
where physicians have outsized power over the patient—the physician decides
what treatments patients receive and what medications patients are prescribed.
Physicians enjoy significant public trust and authority over patients. In that
context, physicians can easily intimidate patients or suggest that any reports of
misconduct will not be believed. 132 Difficulties inherent to transferring
physicians, and other limitations on what physicians a patient can see, make
126. Id.
127. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159; Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians,
supra note 10, at 504–05; Fed’n of State Med. Bds., Report and Recommendations of the FSMB
Workgroup on Physician Sexual Misconduct, J. MED. REGUL., July 2020, at 21–22 (2020); Alan
Judd, Doctors & Sex Abuse: Condemnation Without Action, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 6, 2016),
https://doctors.ajc.com/ama_sex_abuse_doctors/.
128. KATE HARDING, ASKING FOR IT: THE ALARMING RISE OF RAPE CULTURE—AND WHAT
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 1 (2015).
129. Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem (last visited Sept. 25, 2021); The Criminal Justice
System: Statistics, RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/
criminal-justice-system (last visited Sept. 25, 2021).
130. The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 129.
131. Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Panic and Denial, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 458, 468–69 (2018).
132. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; Carrie Teegardin et al.,
Doctors & Sex Abuse: License to Betray, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 6, 2016), https://doctors.ajc.
com/part_1_license_to_betray/; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

70

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:55

patients dependent on physicians, even when the physician misuses their power
by engaging in assault. 133 In that context, we would expect reporting to be even
less common than it is among the general public and consequences for
misconduct even less severe. 134
On top of that, physicians are situated in organizations like hospitals and
clinics that have an interest in maintaining their workforce and warding off
claims of misconduct. 135 For these and other reasons, many types of
organizations protect perpetrators of sexual crimes from the consequences of
their actions. 136 They do so by engaging in two processes: (1) buffering and (2)
circulating. 137
a. Buffering
Organizations buffer when they create legalistic structures and organizationspecific disciplinary procedures that signal to the outside world that they are
taking care of the problem when, in fact, they often offer far less severe
consequences. 138 Consider, for example, how sexual assault is handled in
American universities. 139 Universities are federally required to have Title IX
offices, and they typically have student disciplinary proceedings for sexual
assault. 140 Students who are assaulted can report to the Title IX office and often
do so instead of going to the police. 141 Sexual assault is a crime, but universities
buffer perpetrators from criminal consequences by sending students through
university disciplinary proceedings whose worst punishments—suspension and
expulsion—are far less punitive than outcomes like incarceration that can result
from legal proceedings. 142

133. See, e.g., Lacie Glover & David Levine, What to Do When Your Doctor Leaves Your
Health Plan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/
patient-advice/articles/what-to-do-when-your-doctor-leaves-your-health-plan.
134. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504.
135. Danny Robbins, Doctors & Sex Abuse: Hospital Believed Doctor over Victims, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://doctors.ajc.com/wisconsin_university_hospital_doctor/.
136. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159.
137. Id.; Sonja K. Lilienthal & Rebecca J. Mowrey, Stop “Passing the Trash”: Addressing the
Circulation of Repeat Sex Offenders in Coaching, J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE,
Sept. 2006, at 3, 3.
138. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26.
139. HIRSCH & KHAN, supra note 27, at 215; Leon, supra note 27, at 999.
140. Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/title-ix/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2021); see, e.g., Celene Reynolds, The Mobilization of Title IX Across U.S. Colleges
and Universities, 1994-2014, 66 SOC. PROBS. 245, 245–73 (2019).
141. Why Schools Handle Sexual Violence Reports, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.
org/issues/schools-handle-sexual-violence-reports/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
142. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26.
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b. Circulating
A second strategy that organizations use to protect their members is
circulating. I use the term circulating to describe the process of sending
offenders to a different organization rather than punishing them. Instead of
motivating offenders to stop their behavior or protecting current victims, this
strategy simply spreads harm around and puts new groups at risk.
Circulating helps to protect the organization’s reputation while also getting
rid of the perpetrator. The Catholic Church famously used this strategy to get rid
of priests who were sexually assaulting young boys, a process known as “priest
shuffling.” 143 This strategy is also used by universities to get rid of professors
who assault students, by police departments to get rid of officers who harm
citizens, and by high schools to get rid of coaches who assault players. 144
Sometimes circulating is direct, such as when organizations send perpetrators
off with glowing references and a promise not to disclose wrongdoing to their
new employers. 145 In other cases, circulating is indirect, such as when
organizations fire perpetrators without taking other steps to mitigate harm.146
Both direct and indirect circulating create the opportunity for the perpetrator to
harm others at their new job.
McIntosh and her colleagues find examples of indirect circulating in the
medical setting. 147 Hospitals and academic medical center administrators who
identify unsafe practitioners will, at times, dismiss a dangerous practitioner in a
way that does not require reporting. 148 They limit harm to their own patients by
offloading that harm onto patients at other facilities. 149 This circumvents the
board and does nothing to reduce harm more generally.
If the physician leaves “voluntarily,” the hospital is not required to report
the physician to the National Practitioner Data Bank, a system that “tracks
malpractice payouts and adverse actions taken against doctors, such as being
143. EWICK & STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 5–7; Nina Shapiro, Breach of Faith, SEATTLE
WKLY. (Oct. 9, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.seattleweekly.com/news/breach-of-faith/.
144. Shapiro, supra note 143; Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in
Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/whereaboutsof-cast-out-police-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them.html; Christian Willmsen & Maureen
O’Hagan, Coaches Continue Working for Schools and Private Teams After Being Caught for
Sexual Misconduct, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 14, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://special.seattletimes.com/o/
news/local/coaches/news/dayone.html; Sarah L. Young & Kimberly K. Wiley, Erased: Why
Faculty Sexual Misconduct Is Prevalent and How We Could Prevent It, 27 J. PUB. AFFS. EDUC.
276, 282–83 (2021).
145. Lilienthal & Mowrey, supra note 137.
146. Williams, supra note 144.
147. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Laura Beil, A Surgeon So Bad It Was Criminal, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/dr-death-christopher-duntsch-a-surgeon-so-bad-it-wascriminal.
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fired, barred from Medicare, handed a long suspension, or having a license
suspended or revoked.” 150 Failure to report protects both the physician’s and the
hospital’s reputation, even as doing so disseminates harm to unsuspecting
patients. 151 Journalists have documented physicians moving from institution to
institution, despite inappropriate behavior, without sanction. 152 These
physicians harm students/trainees, ancillary health care professionals, peer
physicians, as well as patients. 153 Like moving polluted water around a pool
instead of draining it away, organizations that circulate dangerous physicians
compromise the integrity of the entire profession.
4. Lack of Patient Reporting
Hospitals and clinics are not the only entities that fail to hold bad physicians
accountable. Patients who have been harmed and their families often fail to
report to either the physician’s employer or the board. 154 However, their
motivations differ from those of organizations and depend on the type of harm
perpetuated. 155 Consider two types of egregious harm that McIntosh et al. and
Pendo et al. investigate: sexual assault and over-prescribing opioids. 156
Patients who are sexually assaulted by their physicians likely do not report
the assault for the same reasons that sexual assault survivors more generally do
not report—survivors fear they will not be believed, or they fear they will face
retaliation. 157 The small proportion of patients who do report struggle to
determine the best outlet for their report. 158 Options include the police, the
hospital or clinic, and the board. They can certainly report to all three but

150. Id.
151. Id.; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
152. Ginger Christ & Brie Zeltner, System to Screen and Credential Newly-Hired Doctors Can
Miss Previous Sexual Assault Allegations, Ohio State Case Shows, CLEVELAND.COM,
https://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/2018/01/system_to_screen_and_credentia.html; Jayne
O’Donnell, Confidential Deals Can Obscure Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against Doctors as
Cleveland Clinic Case Shows, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/
01/05/confidential-deals-can-obscure-sexual-misconduct-allegations-against-doctors-alleged-rape
-doctors/868921001/ (last updated Jan. 6, 2018, 8:36 AM).
153. Christ & Zeltner, supra note 152; O’Donnell, supra note 152; Michelle A. Petrovic &
Adam T. Scholl, Why We Need a Single Definition of Disruptive Behavior, CUREUS, Mar. 18, 2018,
at 1, 1–7; Jose de Leon et al., Dealing with Difficult Medical Colleagues, 87 PSYCHOTHERAPY &
PSYCHOSOMATICS 5, 5–6 (2018).
154. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; Hart, supra note 110;
Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
155. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504.
156. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13.
157. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; Teegardin & Robbins,
supra note 110.
158. Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine, supra note 10, at 29.
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figuring out the best place to report can prove challenging, and each of these
organizations has a reputation for failing to act. 159
Patients who are over-prescribed opioids likely have different motivations
for failing to report. Unlike sexual assault, where patients receive something that
they did not ask for and to which they did not consent, patients often want and
need opioids to treat pain, to manage an opioid use disorder, or both.160
Therefore, it may be families of patients on opioids who seek to curb opioid
prescribing rather than the patients themselves. As legal scholar Kelly Dineen
points out, organizations also operate in a gray area around opioid prescribing
since there is no clear standard for how much medication is too much. 161 It is
thus reasonable to expect that causes of underreporting are due to different
factors and circumstances.
Processing barriers impede information about physician wrongdoing from
getting to the board. Given what we know about other organizations, it would
be reasonable to expect that hospitals and clinics engage in buffering and
circulating instead of reporting to the board. 162 Buffering helps to protect the
organization’s financial and reputational interests, while circulating helps to
protect the organization’s reputation. At the same time, patients rarely report
wrongdoing to hospitals and clinics, which adds another layer of filtration to
processing barriers—hospital and clinic administrators can only act on the
information they receive. 163
With a reactive board and a lack of reporting, it is no wonder that boards do
not act—they often do not receive the information they need to do so. 164 Patient
hesitancy and organizational processes like buffering and circulating help
explain why boards do not receive the information that they should. 165 But what

159. Serious Ethical Violations in Medicine, supra note 10, at 20, 29; Sexual Violation of
Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra
note 110; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13; Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual
Assault: An Empirical Examination, 21 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 1–2, 6 (2015).
160. Elizabeth Chiarello, The War on Drugs Comes to the Pharmacy Counter: Frontline Work
in the Shadow of Discrepant Institutional Logics, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 86, 90 (2015) [hereinafter
The War on Drugs Comes to the Pharmacy Counter]; TRAVIS RIEDER, IN PAIN: A BIOETHICIST’S
PERSONAL STRUGGLE WITH OPIOIDS 39 (2019).
161. Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: A Taxonomy of Inappropriate Prescribing to Shape
Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm, 67 U. KAN L. REV. 961, 966–69 (2019).
162. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159.
163. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; Hart, supra note 110;
Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
164. Chiarello, supra note 114, at 14; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6, 15; Patricia A. King
et al., Contextualizing and Strengthening State Medical Board Responses to Physician Sexual
Misconduct, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 151, 160 (2022).
165. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26; Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note
10, at 504; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
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about the information that is communicated to them? Why do boards so often
fail to discipline physicians of whose harmful behavior they are made aware?
B.

Processing Barriers

The answer lies in processing barriers. Processing barriers are those barriers
that prevent boards from acting effectively on the information they receive.
Several factors likely shape how boards process information, including factors
like buffering and circulating that prevent boards from receiving complaints in
the first place. 166 Board members face conflicts between their professional
identities, their duty to fulfill the board’s obligation to discipline physicians, and
their responsibility to protect the public. 167 Boards often resolve these conflicts
in ways that prioritize their fellow professionals over the public. 168 First, I will
trace contours of this fundamental conflict between the interests of the
profession and the public, then I will show three ways that board members
privilege physicians over patients: (1) the white wall of silence, (2) buffering
impaired professionals, and (3) involving physician experts in board
investigations.
1. Grappling with Conflict
The contemporary structure of medical boards raises some important
questions about the board’s mission, physicians’ professional identities, and
what it means to protect the public. 169 When it comes to the board’s mission,
board members are required to act in ways that protect the public, part of which
involves disciplining physicians who inflict egregious harm. 170 This puts them
at odds with physicians who behave badly. However, when it comes to
professional identity, the vast majority of board members are physicians
themselves, and this puts the board members in a position to identify with other
physicians despite the fact that those physicians are causing harm. 171 True,
boards have public members, but the number of physicians has always far
outweighed the number of public members, so public members have little
capacity to challenge physicians’ power on the board. 172
How do physician board members contend with competing impulses to
protect the public and to protect fellow professionals? Evidence suggests that

166. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159; Lilienthal & Mowrey, supra note 137.
167. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 11.
168. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 517; HOROWITZ, supra note
1, at 22; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
169. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 3; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76, at 12.
170. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 3, 7.
171. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 517; HOROWITZ, supra note
1, at 16; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76, at 11–12.
172. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 12–13.
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they typically err on the side of protecting fellow professionals. 173 McIntosh et
al. tell us that very few physicians face the most severe forms of disciplinary
action—suspension, surrender, or revocation of a license. 174 What prevents
boards from using the strongest weapons at their disposal to stop patient harm?
I suggest that there are intraprofessional and structural forces at play, and that
these forces result in buffering and circulating at the board level. 175
2. Professional Identity: The White Wall of Silence
Professionals have a shared identity. 176 They undergo extensive training that
socializes them into particular ways of thinking about the world and about
themselves. 177 For physicians, this shared training, that is by all accounts
rigorous and relentless, looks not unlike a fraternity hazing process where the
newest members perform grunt work to prove themselves to established
professionals. 178 Individuals are broken down by sleep deprivation, long work
hours, and demanding tasks, and built up into freshly minted, if world-weary,
professionals. 179 Like other individuals who undergo extensive training and
socialization processes—fraternity members, college athletes, members of the
military, and cult members—physicians emerge from their training with a strong
sense of connection to their fellow travelers. 180 Intensive socialization helps to
explain why physicians shield fellow professionals from accountability for
certain offenses. 181
Professionals tend to protect their own. Much like the so-called “blue wall
of silence” that motivates police officers to protect one another even in light of
egregious wrongdoing, 182 scholars argue that physicians experience a white wall
of silence that motivates them to protect one another despite evidence of patient
173. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; HOROWITZ, supra note
1, at 5; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110; McIntosh et al., supra note 5,
at 5–6.
174. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
175. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 154.
176. Elizabeth H. Gorman & Rebecca L. Sandefur, “Golden Age,” Quiescence, and Revival:
How the Sociology of Professions Became the Study of Knowledge-Based Work, 38 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 275, 286 (2011).
177. HOWARD SAUL BECKER ET AL., BOYS IN WHITE: STUDENT CULTURE IN MEDICAL
SCHOOL 4–6 (1984); KATHERINE C. KELLOGG, CHALLENGING OPERATIONS: MEDICAL REFORM
AND RESISTANCE IN SURGERY 30 (2011).
178. KELLOGG, supra note 177, at 21–22, 32.
179. BECKER ET AL., supra note 177, at 206, 218; KELLOGG, supra note 177, at 30.
180. Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, Intense Loyalty in Organizations: A Case Study of College
Athletics, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 401, 407 (1988); ERVING GOFFMAN, ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
TOTAL INSTITUTIONS (1957), http://www.markfoster.net/neurelitism/totalinstitutions.pdf;
KELLOGG, supra note 177, at 30–31.
181. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 128.
182. Louise Westmarland, Police Ethics and Integrity: Breaking the Blue Code of Silence, 15
POLICING & SOC’Y 145, 151, 161 (2005).
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harm. 183 Physicians struggle to determine whether another physician did
something wrong, and even when they uncover wrongdoing, feel more
compelled to protect their fellow professionals than to care for the patient. 184
Codified punishments for testifying against other doctors are the foundation on
which the white wall of silence was built, and self-protective impulses are the
mortar that keeps it in place. 185 Horowitz explains how norms established
decades ago result in infrequent reporting of physicians by other physicians. 186
For decades, boards punished doctors for testifying against other members of
their profession, and even though those formal sanctions are no longer in place,
their legacy persists. 187 Beyond that, physicians today hesitate to condemn their
peers for wrongdoing lest they find themselves in the crosshairs. 188 A sort of
gentleman’s agreement protects physicians from criticism by their peers. 189
However, protection is not a foregone conclusion.
Social science research on how professionals behave in contexts outside of
their disciplines suggests that workers who are torn between their professional
identities and organizational expectations cope by adopting new roles or
preserving old ones. 190 For example, Nelson and Nielsen’s study of corporate
lawyers found that these professionals struggled to maintain their professional
identities and norms when working in corporations that pushed them to behave
differently. 191 Lawyers responded by acting as cops, counsel, or entrepreneurs,
either maintaining or relaxing their professional roles. 192 In my own work, I find
that pharmacists who face pressures to engage in both medical and legal
gatekeeping tasks cope by constructing their roles in ways that enable them to
engage in treatment, enforcement, or avoidance. 193 This research suggests that
physician board members could react in various ways. They could eschew
camaraderie with fellow professionals to affirm their role as board members, or
they could ease their obligations as board members in favor of allying with

183. ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, WALL OF SILENCE: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE MEDICAL MISTAKES THAT KILL AND INJURE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 136 (2003);
E. Haavi Morreim, Am I My Brother’s Warden?: Responding to the Unethical or Incompetent
Colleague, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 1993, at 19, 20.
184. GIBSON & SINGH, supra note 183; Morreim, supra note 183, at 20.
185. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 53, 55.
186. Id. at 123.
187. Id. at 53, 55.
188. GIBSON & SINGH, supra note 183, at 137; Morreim, supra note 183, at 20.
189. GIBSON & SINGH, supra note 183; Morreim, supra note 183, at 20.
190. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 457, 477–78, 483 (2000).
191. Id. at 471.
192. Id. at 462.
193. The War on Drugs Comes to the Pharmacy Counter, supra note 160, at 88, 103.
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fellow professionals. Research on boards demonstrates that they are more likely
to do the latter. 194
3. Buffering Impaired Professionals
Silence from fellow professionals is only one factor that prevents boards
from taking action against physicians who do harm. Another factor is the use of
Physician Health Programs (PHPs). 195 PHPs are a form of channeling that occurs
at the board level. 196 Designed to help impaired physicians, PHPs do more than
help providers get treatment; they protect those providers from the board. 197 By
allowing providers to voluntarily enter a PHP, boards relinquish power to
rehabilitation programs that maintain strict confidentiality (even from the
boards). 198
PHPs are typically run by professional associations whose mission is to
protect the profession, not to protect the public. 199 PHPs place physicians who
do harm beyond the board’s reach, thereby cutting off input from public
members and shielding impaired physicians from discipline. 200 Some physicians
who participate in these programs have committed those offenses that Pendo et
al. and McIntosh et al. label “egregious,” such as sexual assault. 201 Some of these
physicians go through treatment as minor as a three-day training program, and
there is debate about whether that kind of program prepares them to return to
practice. 202
By contrast, programs for physicians with substance use disorders—
physicians whose primary harm is to themselves—can drag on for years and fail
to provide evidence-based care. 203 One physician, Peter Grinspoon, has been
outspoken about his experience with a PHP. 204 He reports that he was sent to

194. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504; HOROWITZ, supra note
1, at 128; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
195. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., POLICY ON PHYSICIAN ILLNESS AND IMPAIRMENT:
TOWARDS A MODEL THAT OPTIMIZES PATIENT SAFETY AND PHYSICIAN HEALTH § II (2019),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/policy-on-physician-impairment.pdf.
196. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 65–66; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra
note 110.
197. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 66; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note
110.
198. POLICY ON PHYSICIAN ILLNESS AND IMPAIRMENT, supra note 195; HOROWITZ, supra
note 1, at 66.
199. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 60, 64.
200. Id. at 66.
201. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13.
202. Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note 110.
203. Leo Beletsky et al., Practicing What We Preach — Ending Physician Health Program
Bans on Opioid-Agonist Therapy, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 796, 796–97 (2019).
204. Selena Simmons-Duffin, For Health Workers Struggling with Addiction, Why Are
Treatment Options Limited?, NPR (Sept. 6, 2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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Christian-based treatment programs even though he is a Jewish atheist and was
barred from using effective medications for opioid use disorder such as
buprenorphine and methadone. 205 Instead, he was required to remain abstinent
throughout the program. 206 When PHPs provide treatment that lacks a strong
evidence base, these programs are unlikely to solve the problems that led to
patient harm or to protect patients from harm when the provider returns to the
workplace. 207 As a result, PHPs appear to be mechanisms for maintaining the
white wall of silence more than they look like effective remedies for preventing
patient harm. 208
4. Expert Physician Involvement in Disciplinary Processes
Even when physicians face the board instead of being channeled into PHPs,
professionals still find ways to protect one another from consequences.
Protectionism manifests in the standard of care as a basis for determining harm
and in physician involvement in board investigations. 209
Board members typically use the standard of care to determine whether a
physician has engaged in wrongdoing. 210 The standard of care is a somewhat
fluid concept that depends on whether the physician is behaving in a way that
vastly diverges from the behavior of physicians in their specialty. 211 With this
in mind, many boards build in physician experts at many steps of the disciplinary
process to ensure that the physician is actually violating the standard of care. 212
Now, the standard of care is less important in cases that involve egregious
misconduct because those acts violate professional ethical and legal standards
even if everyone else is doing them. 213 Still, professional expertise typically
remains a part of board’s choices about pursuing cases. 214 Pair these structural
requirements with the white wall of silence, and it is no surprise that board
members are so hesitant to pursue the strongest levels of discipline. 215
shots/2019/09/06/757990241/for-health-workers-struggling-with-addiction-why-are-treatmentoptions-limited.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 67; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra note
110.
208. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 66, 74; Hart, supra note 110; Teegardin & Robbins, supra
note 110.
209. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 106, 124; Sandra H. Johnson, Customary Standard of Care:
A Challenge for Regulation and Practice, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 9 (2013); NSF Award No.
1753308, supra note 18.
210. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 70, 187.
211. Johnson, supra note 209, at 9.
212. NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
213. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 134, 158; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13.
214. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 110, 135; NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
215. GIBSON & SINGH, supra note 183, at 136–37; Morreim, supra note 183, at 20.
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To understand how this works, consider an example from my own research
in California. 216 Over the last ten years, I have interviewed criminal and
administrative investigators, board members, and board executives in several
states about how they contend with cases of opioid overprescribing. I was
surprised to learn how differently the medical board and the pharmacy board
operate. 217
At the time of my interviews, the executive director of the pharmacy board
was a consumer advocate. 218 Her master’s degree was in consumer science with
a focus on consumer protection, and she had no special relationship to pharmacy
as a profession. 219 She saw her job as protecting the public, not protecting
pharmacists. 220 The executive director of the medical board also had extensive
experience in consumer protection before coming to work for the board. 221 So,
on the surface, both executives were committed to protecting the public. But the
pharmacy board was far more inclined to pursue pharmacists for over-dispensing
than the medical board was to pursue physicians for overprescribing. 222 The
investigatory structure explains why.
Like many agencies, both boards were reactive instead of proactive. 223 They
did not go out looking for cases, but rather responded to each complaint they
received. 224 However, at the pharmacy board, decisions about which cases to
pursue were made by the executive director in conjunction with her lead
investigator, someone with a law enforcement background. 225 By contrast, at the
medical board, decisions about which cases to pursue were made by physician
experts who decided at several points in the process whether or not a case should
move forward. 226
The pharmacy board had two people with no connection to pharmacy
making decisions about pharmacists, but the medical board had a medical expert
vulnerable to the professional norms of the white wall of silence who decided
whether the case moved forward. 227 It makes sense, then, that the pharmacy
board was more inclined to pursue harsh punishment than the medical board. 228
To be clear, I am not suggesting that all physician experts want to stop the board
from disciplining physicians. I have certainly met experts who embraced this
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
Id.
Chiarello, supra note 114, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 5, 13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 3.
Chiarello, supra note 114, at 11.
See, e.g., id. at 11, 16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 2, 13–14.
Chiarello, supra note 114, at 3.
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gatekeeping role, but given what research tells us about how professionals
protect each other, it would be reasonable to expect that an investigatory
structure that requires physician involvement buffers physicians from the
harshest consequences.
Together, a shared professional identity that results in a white wall of silence
and systematic involvement of physician experts in board investigations
constitute processing barriers that protect physicians from the consequence of
inflicting egregious harm. 229 These help to explain why boards do not discipline
physicians even when they are aware of wrongdoing. However, boards do
discipline some physicians, which raises the question of whether and how
information obtained by boards makes its way into other institutional arenas with
the power to punish.
C. Output Barriers
The third barrier to physician discipline is output barriers. How do medical
boards’ practices of sharing or withholding information affect outcomes for
physicians who perpetuate egregious harm? Boards are only one organization
with the power to discipline providers. They have the option to revoke a
physician’s license and essentially end their livelihood. 230 However, other
disciplinary organizations have tools that can equally hamstring physicians’
practices or impose even harsher discipline. 231 For example, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) at the state and federal level can put
limits on a physician’s National Provider Identifier (NPI), a number that enables
them to bill government insurance. 232 The Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) can revoke a physician’s DEA registration, which allows them to
prescribe controlled substances. 233 The DEA can also pursue criminal charges
against a physician with the goal of putting them in prison. 234
These disciplinary efforts appear, at first glance, to be independent because
they involve different kinds of workers in different kinds of agencies, but a
pharmacy law expert explained to me that they can have a “domino effect.” 235
Obviously, if a physician loses their license to practice medicine or is put in
229. BECKER ET AL., supra note 177, at 428, 430; Chiarello, supra note 114, at 4, 6; Morreim,
supra note 183, at 20, 25–26.
230. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 1.
231. See Chiarello, supra note 114, at 8 fig. 2 (depicting various enforcement agencies and the
types of enforcement available to them).
232. Andrew Breza, The Complete History of the NPI Number, BULLETINHEALTHCARE (Dec.
14, 2018), https://www.bulletinhealthcare.com/the-complete-history-of-the-npi-number/; see 42
C.F.R. § 424.540(a) (2020) (providing that CMS may deactivate a physician’s Medicare billing
privileges, which is tied to the physician’s NPI).
233. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.36(a) (2020).
234. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(b).
235. NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
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prison, their entire livelihood falls apart. However, even what appear to be more
minor punishments, like NPI restrictions or DEA registration revocation, can
seriously impede practice. Few hospitals or clinics are willing to hire or retain
physicians who cannot prescribe controlled substances or who cannot bill
government insurance. 236 Beyond that, consequences in one arena often trigger
consequences in another. 237 Enforcement agents I interviewed explained how
the medical board would piggyback on their work such that when they
successfully prosecuted a physician, the medical board would use the
prosecution as an excuse to revoke their medical license. 238 This was often
expressed as frustration with the medical board’s unwillingness to act.
Sometimes, the opposite occurs and the DEA pursues criminal charges against
a physician after the medical board takes actions. 239 Regardless of directionality,
the point is that these kinds of disciplinary procedures mutually impact one
another. 240 The question is how? How does information about physician
wrongdoing travel from one agency to another and what facilitates or impedes
that process?
1. Boards Circulate Perpetrators by Withholding Information
There are two organizations with whom we might expect boards to share
information: medical boards in other states and law enforcement. Many
physicians are licensed in multiple states, so we would expect boards that
discipline a physician in one state to alert boards in other states so they can take
similar action. 241
We would also expect boards to share information with law enforcement.
The egregious acts that warrant suspension or revocation of a medical license
also tend to be crimes. 242 Sexual assault, overprescribing opioids, and fraudulent
surgeries are all criminal activities, so when those cases come to the board’s
attention, it would be reasonable to expect the board to alert organizations
responsible for investigating those crimes such as local police, state medical
fraud units, the DEA, or the Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector
General. 243
236. Id.
237. See Chiarello, supra note 114, at 3, 8.
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id.
241. Aaron Young et al., FSMB Census of Licensed Physicians in the United States, 2018, J.
MED. REGUL., July 1, 2019, at 7, 9.
242. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 35 (suggesting from publicized cases that “physicians
continue to practice after arrest, conviction, or other determination related to criminal conduct that
harms patients”).
243. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., A ROADMAP FOR
NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 3 (n.d.) (noting that
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Yet, it is not entirely clear how often boards share information about their
own investigations. According to the Federation of State Medical Boards
(FSMB),
[w]hen a state medical board is notified that a physician licensed in its
jurisdiction received a board action in another jurisdiction, the board can choose
to open its own investigation or in many cases will choose to take a reciprocal
action. . . . In 2020, 1,491 physicians were disciplined for the first time and
1,008 reciprocal actions were taken by state boards. 244

However, this leaves no clear indication of how information is shared or what
legal and logistical burdens prevent communication between boards. The
experts interviewed by McIntosh et al. overwhelmingly prioritized suspending a
physician’s license when it had been suspended in another state for egregious
wrongdoing. 245
As I mentioned above, revoking a license can destroy a physician’s
livelihood by prohibiting them from practicing, but this punishment is far less
severe if they can simply continue to practice in another state, especially one
with a “soft” regulatory regime. 246 We can think about boards’ failure to act as
a form of circulating. Like parishes, universities, police departments, and sports
teams, some boards take an out-of-sight, out-of-mind approach—as long as the
bad actor is not under their purview, the bad actor is not their problem. 247 This
creates an opportunity for bad physicians to circulate throughout states, harming
patients along the way. Aggregated information about physicians does exist in
the form of the FSMB’s Physician Data Center and the National Practitioner
Data Bank. Still, boards often fail to directly communicate with one another. It
is unknown whether boards do not share with other boards because they are
legally restricted from doing so, because there is no systematic way to exchange
fraudulent claims are a criminal offense, and that the Office of Inspector General may impose
administrative civil monetary penalties for such actions); State Law Database, RAPE ABUSE &
INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://apps.rainn.org/policy/?_ga=2.217812694.1789709361.1632282
440-2058441927.1632282440 (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (providing information on sexual violence
laws in each state); Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
244. Physician Discipline, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. (2020), https://www.fsmb.org/u.s.medical-regulatory-trends-and-actions/u.s.-medical-licensing-and-disciplinary-data/physiciandiscipline/.
245. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 13.
246. Id. at 6.
247. See Shapiro, supra note 143 (noting “priest shuffling and secrecy” by church officials);
Williams, supra note 144 (noting how problematic police officers drift from department to
department); Willmsen & O’Hagan, supra note 144 (noting how a coach accused of sexual
misconduct was “nudged” out of town and allowed to obtain another coaching job elsewhere);
EWICK & STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 3, 7 (noting the shuffling of priests accused of sexual
misconduct from parish to parish); Young & Wiley, supra note 144, at 276 (noting how universities
and higher education programs are designed to support a culture of complicity and complacency
around sexual misconduct).
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information across boards, or because they want to protect physicians from
overly harsh punishment. However, it would be reasonable to expect some
combination of these motivations to explain why boards withhold information
and, through their inaction, permit physicians to continue to harm patients.
2. Tension and Lack of Communication Between Boards and Law
Enforcement
Similar barriers might explain why boards do not share information with law
enforcement. These, and other barriers, uniquely compromise the board/law
enforcement relationship. In my own research, I have uncovered quite a bit of
tension between boards and agencies that investigate opioid crimes. 248 Both
organizations find the other to be an impediment to their own investigations. 249
Board members and executives complain that federal agencies like the DEA take
records that they need and refuse to share. 250 Criminal investigators complain
that boards catch wind of their cases, do audits on the targeted physician, and
ruin years of undercover work. 251 These frustrations can be attributed to legal
and organizational differences that put organizations that engage in
administrative investigations, like SMBs, at odds with organizations that engage
in criminal investigations, like the DEA and state fraud units. 252
These organizations have different goals, resources, and legal requirements
that lead to different strategies and put the organizations on very different
timelines. 253 Boards aim to suspend or revoke licenses of physicians who impose
harm while enforcement agencies aim to put them in prison. 254 The best resource
that boards have to conduct investigations is the audit—a tactic that puts
physicians on high alert since they know they are being watched and that could
scare physicians into changing their behavior. 255 The best resource that
enforcement agencies have is undercover investigations, which they can use to
show a pattern of illegal behavior. 256 This strategy requires secrecy; if the
physician knows they are being investigated, they might change their behavior
or kick the undercover investigator out of their practice, either of which would
compromise the investigation. 257 Audits can happen quickly, whereas
undercover investigations can take months, sometimes years. 258 These
248.
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250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See Chiarello, supra note 114, at 10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 8.
Chiarello, supra note 114, at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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Chiarello, supra note 114, at 9.
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organizations also have different burdens of proof. In most states, boards must
show either a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning that it is more likely
than not that the physician did what the board claims they did, or “clear and
convincing evidence,” meaning that it must be substantially more probable than
not that the physician did what the board claims. 259 By contrast, enforcement
agencies like the DEA must prove their case “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
meaning that the proof is so strong that a reasonable person would have no
plausible reason to believe otherwise. 260 Boards also have the option of an
interim suspension order, meaning they can immediately stop the physician from
practicing if the physician is found guilty of a felony, poses an imminent danger
to their patient’s health, or has been disciplined in another jurisdiction (though
the availability of interim suspension orders differs across states). 261
Both types of organizations are obligated to stop physicians from harming
the public, but how they do so varies, and their different goals, resources, and
timelines create opportunities for them to get in each other’s way. 262 For
example, one federal investigator I interviewed in Missouri explained how a
board audit cost him his case against a physician. A board investigator was aware
that the agency was investigating the case and confronted the physician before
the investigation was complete. He explains, “a Board went to a practitioner and
said ‘You’re so bad that the DEA is looking at you. You need to knock off what
you’re doing.’” The physician responded by firing most of his patients, including
those involved in the undercover investigation, and prescribing far more
cautiously. The federal investigator explained the source of his frustration with
the board investigator: “We had enough to support a criminal investigation but
not necessarily to move forward with a prosecution yet. So here we are building
our investigation and [the board investigator] torpedoed the whole thing.” 263
These kinds of “burns” create contention between boards and enforcement
agencies that makes it difficult for them to see one another as allies in preventing
patient harm. 264
Although enforcement agents were sometimes frustrated when boards
stepped in too soon, more often they were frustrated with medical board
inaction. 265 Their reasoning was that boards have a lower burden of proof and
259. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES (2006).
260. United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1975).
261. Cathal T. Gallagher et al., The Legal Underpinnings of Medical Discipline in Common
Law Jurisdictions, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 15, 24–25 (2019).
262. See Chiarello, supra note 114, at 2; HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 83; Controlled Substances
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (explaining the purpose and goals of the Controlled Substances Act).
263. NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
264. Chiarello, supra note 114, at 10–11.
265. See id. at 9, 11 (noting friction arising from the administrative agents’ shorter timelines,
as well as tension when a board waits to discipline providers).
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have the power to issue an immediate suspension order to stop bad doctors from
practicing. 266 They believe that boards are too lenient with physicians and find
that boards wait until the criminal investigation is done before acting when they
could act much sooner to prevent patient harm. 267 Enforcement agents are of two
minds about the role of the board: on the one hand, enforcement agents would
like boards to act sooner and, on the other hand, they do not want boards to act
too soon in ways that prevent them from securing the harshest penalties for
criminal providers. 268 In both cases, tensions between enforcement agents and
boards constrain their ability to work together. 269
The reason that boards do not share information with law enforcement is
probably also due to buffering mechanisms that I described earlier with
physician board members motivated to protect their own. 270 However, structural
barriers exist as well. There are rarely any established pathways for routine
communication between board members and law enforcement, so they are
unlikely to know who to call even if they wanted to report. 271 The enforcement
agents I spoke with who routinely communicated with board investigators had
established interpersonal relationships, often serendipitously, that facilitated
information exchange. 272 However, this was not the norm. 273 There was a great
deal of communication among law enforcement agencies, but far less between
enforcement agents and boards. 274As a result, contentious and non-existent
relationships between boards and law enforcement may motivate the lack of
information exchange between boards and law enforcement. 275
Collectively, input barriers, processing barriers, and output barriers help
explain why boards do not punish physicians who engage in egregious harm.
This organizational and cultural analysis explains why hospitals and clinics
resist sharing information with boards, why boards fail to impose the harshest
penalties, and why boards resist sharing information with other boards and with
law enforcement. This analysis highlights the processes by which organizations

266. Id. at 9.
267. Id. at 11.
268. Id.
269. Chiarello, supra note 114, at 9–11.
270. See Williams, supra note 144 (providing an example of how law enforcement protects
their own); Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159 (noting how buffering prevents intrusion);
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 123 (noting health care providers’ reluctance to report physicians).
271. Chiarello, supra note 114, at 11.
272. See id. at 9–11 (providing excerpts of conversations from enforcement agents who worked
with boards).
273. See id. at 10 (noting relationships are “fragile” and originate “from a place of distrust” that
develops into trust).
274. Id. at 12.
275. See id. at 11 (noting how limited interaction between boards and law enforcement impacts
the extent of their working relationships).
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protect their members and the structural barriers that prevent information
exchange across organizations.
IV. INTERVENTIONS
If input, processing, and output barriers prevent boards from acting in the
public interest, what should be done to overcome those barriers? A cultural and
organizational approach offers a pathway forward to arrive at effective solutions
and to fortify boards’ capacity to act in the public interest.
Many of the problems I have uncovered here stem from deeply-rooted
cultural norms and institutionalized organizational practices. 276 Neither culture
nor organizational practices are easy to change. 277 Doing so requires a concerted
effort and renders the status quo untenable such that the new, more desirable
behaviors become the path of least resistance. 278 I offer three strategies for
reorienting boards towards the public interest and discuss how each strategy can
help to overcome one of the three types of barriers. When applicable, I discuss
how the strategies I propose comport with those Pendo et al. propose in their
article in this Issue. 279
Before diving into solutions, I would like to first draw the reader’s attention
to two sociological concepts that help to explain the goals we would like to
achieve: isomorphism and general deterrence. 280 Isomorphism is the process by
which organizations begin to act in similar ways. 281 Organizational theorists
identify three main types of isomorphism: coercive, normative, and mimetic, of
which coercive is most useful for our purposes. 282 Coercive isomorphism
“results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by
other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations
in the society within which organizations function.” 283 When organizations fear
sanctions from the same governing body, they behave alike to avoid those
sanctions. 284 Yet, boards, and the organizations that report to them, lack
isomorphism. McIntosh et al. show us that there is great variability in the
276. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 152; DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 147;
FRIEDLAND & ALFORD, supra note 112, at 242; SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 3.
277. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 148 (noting organizations construct “an
environment that constrains their ability to change”); see KELLOGG, supra note 177, at xi.
278. See KELLOGG, supra note 177, at 186 (noting “institutional change is not likely to occur”
without changes to the status quo).
279. See generally Pendo et al., supra note 5.
280. See generally DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112 (discussing isomorphism); Kirk R.
Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20
L. & Soc’y Rev. 545, 545–72 (1986) (discussing general deterrence).
281. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 149.
282. Id. at 150.
283. Id.
284. See id. (“The existence of a common legal environment affects many aspects of an
organization’s behavior and structure.”).
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frequency and severity of disciplinary actions imposed by SMBs against
physicians who engage in egregious wrongdoing. 285 Variation exists in terms of
input, processing, and output—hospitals and clinics unevenly report
wrongdoing to the board, the board unevenly disciplines, and boards unevenly
share information with other disciplinary agencies. 286 This raises questions
about why this variation occurs and if, perhaps, boards are not sufficiently
concerned about sanctions to behave in similar ways.
The second concept is general deterrence. 287 Criminologists theorize that
punishment does more than just teach the person undergoing the punishment a
lesson. 288 It extends that lesson to other would-be wrong-doers by showing what
could happen to them were they to get caught. 289 In this way, punishment serves
as a mechanism of “general deterrence,” preventing crime on the whole by
making an example of those who are caught. 290 Boards fail to achieve general
deterrence because they inadequately sanction organizations that fail to report,
inadequately discipline physicians, and do not collaborate with other
disciplinary organizations to keep physicians who do harm away from the
public. 291 These failures add up to a missed opportunity to make an example out
of bad actors and wayward organizations and to prevent others from behaving
the same way. 292
The strategies I propose below are designed to achieve both isomorphism
and general deterrence, particularly since the fifty-six recommendations
proposed consensually by the Delphi panel that McIntosh et al. convened are
oriented around these two processes, even though they do not use these exact
terms. 293 The Delphi panel captured these goals in the following statement:
[W]e sought to identify cutting-edge and particularly effective practices,
resources and statutory provisions that SMBs can use to more uniformly: 1)
encourage and enable reporting of physicians who engage in egregious
wrongdoing, 2) investigate physicians who have been accused of egregious
wrongdoing, 3) discipline physicians determined to have engaged in egregious
wrongdoing, and 4) deter physicians from engaging in egregious wrongdoing,
protect and empower patients and increase transparency. 294

285. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
286. Id. at 5–7.
287. Williams & Hawkins, supra note 280, at 546.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 547.
290. See id. (noting how “the perceived threat or fear” of punishment deters people).
291. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 82, 84 (providing examples of boards’ failures); McIntosh
et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
292. See HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 4, 294 (providing an example of such a failure and noting
how failures allow physicians to continue practicing which “adversely affects the public interest”).
293. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 6; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 15.
294. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 6.
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Here, the word “uniformly” speaks to isomorphism and the word “deter” speaks
to general deterrence. 295
Until now, this Article has been organized around the movement of
problems into and out of the board—from input to processing to output.
However, I begin the solutions section with processing barriers because these
are the most important, and they are the changes that will make the other two
solutions more effective. Think about it this way: if a car engine is not working,
it does not help to provide it with more fuel or to fix the exhaust. Only when the
engine itself is fixed will it efficiently process fuel and produce exhaust. The
same is true with boards. When boards fail to sanction physicians for the
egregious harms about which they know, it does not help to inform them about
more egregious harms. Doing so only creates more opportunities for failure. We
also cannot expect boards that fail to punish bad physicians to report those
physicians to other boards or to law enforcement—if boards cannot handle their
own problems, how can they communicate those problems to others? We must
begin, then, by fixing the board’s engine, the way that it processes cases.
A.

Processing: Changing the Way Boards Do Business

Boards are not doing their jobs. Too many physicians get away with causing
egregious harm to patients, even when boards are made aware of their
misdeeds. 296 I explained in a previous Section how fundamental tensions
between professional identity and board goals result in processing barriers such
as the white wall of silence, involvement of physician experts in disciplinary
decisions, and buffering impaired professionals—which prevent boards from
sanctioning physicians who do egregious harm. 297 Removing these barriers
requires rethinking who serves on the board and identifying how powerful
organizations can motivate boards to change.
Two remedies are available to tear down the white wall of silence that
prevents board members from sanctioning fellow professionals: either rules need
to change to motivate existing board members to act in the public interest or the
composition of the board needs to change to bring on more public members who
do not struggle with the tension between professional identity and public
protection.
To change the rules, we first must ask which organizations have coercive
power over boards. Three immediately come to mind: the National Governors
Association (NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and

295. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 149; Williams & Hawkins, supra note 280, at 546.
296. Sexual Violation of Patients by Physicians, supra note 10, at 504. HOROWITZ, supra note
1, at 169–70; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 13.
297. See infra Section III.B.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

BARRIERS TO MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINE

89

the FSMB. 298 Governors and legislatures are responsible for appointing medical
board members, legislatures create states’ medical practice acts, and the FSMB
develops best practices for boards. 299 However, governors and legislatures are
as varied as the boards themselves, so they are not terribly effective forces for
achieving isomorphism. That is why umbrella organizations like the NGA, the
NCSL, and the FSMB offer so much promise. 300 When they work together to
set standards for boards and state medical practice acts, we are likely to see states
adopt the recommended practices and begin to behave similarly. 301 These
organizations also have power to encourage states to restructure boards when
boards prove ineffective at protecting the public.
California’s medical board offers an illustrative case. For decades, the
Medical Board of California had operated relatively independently with its own
investigators that worked for it exclusively, but like many other boards, it had
failed to adequately regulate those physicians who engaged in egregious harm.
In 2013, the California legislature “threatened to dissolve the agency unless it
‘show[ed] significant progress’ in protecting patients from dangerous
doctors.” 302 When the board failed to meet legislators’ demands, legislators
restructured the board and moved their investigators into a new unit under the
umbrella of the Department of Consumer Affairs, making medical board
investigators part of a pool of investigators shared with other boards in the
state. 303 This strong-arm move on the part of the legislature was a way of
punishing the medical board for failure to act, though watchdog groups point to
mixed evidence that restructuring helped to protect patients. 304 I am not
suggesting that all legislatures follow California’s model. However, I am
suggesting that those with power over boards have both carrots and sticks at their
disposal: organizations like NGA, NCSL, and the FSMB can encourage boards
to adopt standards that prioritize patient welfare over protecting physicians,
298. Federation of State Medical Boards, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., https://www.fsmb.org/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2021) [hereinafter FSMB Homepage]; NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES.,
https://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2021); NAT’L
GOVERNORS ASS’N., https://www.nga.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
299. FSMB Homepage, supra note 298; NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note
298; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 298.
300. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 298; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N,
supra note 298.
301. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 152.
302. Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, Legislators Threaten to Kill State Medical Board, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-apr-11-la-me-0412-rxmedical-board-threat-20130412-story.html.
303. Struggles with Delay in Doctor Discipline; Despite Effort at Reform, Cases Are Taking
Longer to Resolve, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.consumer
watchdog.org/california-struggles-delay-doctor-discipline-despite-effort-reform-cases-are-takinglonger-resolve.
304. Id.
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while governors and legislatures can impose sanctions on boards that fail to
fulfill their mission. It is important to note that board structure varies by state,
so interventions would have to be tailored to each state context, but the general
point remains the same—powerful organizations can compel boards to honor
their mission. 305
Changing the rules of the game is one approach; another is changing the
players. 306 It is a common saying that “it is hard to teach an old dog new tricks.”
To that end, it is difficult to upend deeply entrenched cultural values and
professional identities that motivate physicians to protect their own. 307 If trying
to get physician board members to behave otherwise promises to be a strenuous
and fruitless task, then changing the composition of the boards may be more
generative. The current structure of most boards allows for public members, but
as I described earlier, and as Horowitz describes in detail, those members are
often marginalized and are occasionally prevented from participating in some of
the most consequential board decisions. 308 As a result, they sometimes serve a
symbolic function more than an instrumental one. 309
McIntosh and her colleagues suggest that diversifying the board in terms of
race and class could result in better outcomes, as could having a role-diverse
investigatory team. 310 Diversification sounds appealing, and I agree that more
diversity is necessary, but to have the most impact we should go beyond
enhancing diversity to focus on redistributing power. 311 The impetus behind
diversification rests on standpoint theory—that is, the idea that people with
different social positions in terms of race, class, gender, ability, sexuality,
religion, etc. have different life experiences that lead them to approach problems
differently, and as a result, they have different things to offer to the process of
collective decision-making. 312 However, people who are diverse across one
social category, such as race or gender, are not necessarily diverse across other

305. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 154; FSMB Homepage, supra note 298; Denise F.
Lillvis & Robert J. McGrath, Directing Discipline: State Medical Board Responsiveness to State
Legislatures, 42 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L. 123, 149–50 (2017).
306. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 336 (noting external players complicate the world
for organizational participants by making demands on what organizations could or should be
doing).
307. BECKER ET AL., supra note 177, at 419; KELLOGG, supra note 177, at 176, 199; GIBSON
& SINGH, supra note 183, at 136; Morreim, supra note 183, at 24.
308. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 64–65.
309. DAVE ELDER-VASS, THE REALITY OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 61, 63 (1967).
310. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 10, 14–15; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 23–24.
311. ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS
OF RACIAL JUSTICE 35 (2015).
312. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 300 (Heidi Freund ed., Taylor & Francis e-Library 2000).
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social categories, such as professional identity. 313 It might be the case that a male
physician and a female physician see the world differently, but they are both
physicians who have been deeply socialized into the norms of the field. 314
Therefore, we could expect the female physician to make decisions that more
closely resemble those of the male physician compared to those of a female
public member, especially if professional identity trumps other kinds of identity.
Representation, then, is not enough to solve the problem of professional
cohesion. 315 Diversity of perspective promises to offer more than mere
demographic diversity and that diversity must be sufficiently represented to
prevent the problems of tokenism. 316 That is why legislatures should think very
strategically about how many public members to include on the board, and
governors should think very strategically about whom to appoint as board
members. When it comes to problems of egregious harm like sexual assault,
feminist and anti-racist perspectives are particularly important. 317 Boards should
invite public members who are already critical thinkers—members like
Horowitz, who belong to another profession but who bring their own body of
knowledge and professional expertise along with them. 318
Including more non-physician experts does not solve every problem inherent
to board composition—public members can represent the public, but they do not
have enough expertise to make sense of the nuances of medical practice. 319
However, since many of the egregious harms perpetuated by physicians are
social and cultural rather than technical in nature, board members with
independent professional expertise in gender inequality, rape culture, substance
use disorder, and other areas are particularly well-poised to address these issues
in a board setting. 320 As Horowitz notes, “doctors are trained to make an expert
call in cases involving technical medical issues, but they cannot legitimately
claim particular expertise to pass judgment on a problem physician’s character
or to assess the balance of anticipated and unanticipated consequences that a
particular board holding will set in motion.” 321 Efforts to constrain egregious
harm that derives from social, rather than medical, problems is what motivated

313. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1296, 1299 (1991).
314. BECKER ET AL., supra note 177, at 419; KELLOG, supra note 177, at 199.
315. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 6 (1993).
316. Alison Cook & Christy Glass, The Power of One or Power in Numbers? Analyzing the
Effect of Minority Leaders on Diversity Policy and Practice, 42 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 183, 203
(2015); KANTER, supra note 315, at 282.
317. COLLINS, supra note 312, at 158; Crenshaw, supra note 313, at 1274.
318. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at vii.
319. Id. at 63.
320. Id. at 26–27.
321. Id. at 5.
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the movement to include public members on medical boards in the first place. 322
It is also why professional experts are such an asset to boards today. 323
However, it is important to prevent these non-medical experts from being
sidelined as public board members so often are. 324 The organizational theorist
Rosabeth Moss Kanter offers a powerful solution. 325 Speaking to corporations
that tend to tokenize, sideline, and vilify members of minority groups, such as
women and people of color, Kanter proposes bringing in a critical mass of
minority group members. This approach would ensure that minority group
members’ voices are amplified so that they can make real change and not just
serve as symbolic markers of the corporation’s openness to diversity. 326 Her
work on corporations is applicable to organizations more generally, including
boards. 327 The lesson boards can take from Kanter’s work is that adding more
public members and lowering the physician-to-public-member ratio can upset
entrenched power dynamics and allow for a more critical approach to
discipline. 328 The benefit of these kinds of changes is that they create
opportunities to honor the nuances in the kinds of harm perpetuated and arrive
at appropriate sanctions. 329 Once boards process cases more effectively, we can
turn our attention to input and output barriers. 330
B.

Inputs: Routinizing Reporting

Hospitals and clinics often fail to report physician harms to boards, and it is
easy to see why. 331 Pendo et al. spell out the potential negative consequences
that might accompany reporting, such as loss of revenue, loss of patients, and
insurance companies’ unwillingness to pay for the provider’s services. 332 They
argue that boards should levy fines against hospitals and academic medical
centers for failing to report instances of egregious wrongdoing. 333
From a sociological perspective, this is yet another challenge related to
isomorphism, one that requires looking more broadly at the health care field. 334
Viewed in isolation, individual organizations’ failure to report to boards makes
sense for all of the reasons that Pendo, McIntosh, and their colleagues
322. Id.; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 76, at 264.
323. HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at vii.
324. KANTER, supra note 315, at 156.
325. Id. at 11.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 3.
328. See id. at 199, 200, 202–03.
329. KANTER, supra note 315, at 284.
330. Id.
331. See generally Pendo et al., supra note 5.
332. See id. at 28–29 (“Risks to public reputation and financial standing are frequently cited as
disincentives to reporting, and there is often a lack of consequences for failure to report.”).
333. Id.; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 13.
334. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 149.
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identify. 335 However, there is a bigger picture that must also be considered. That
is, the norm across the health care field is to not report. 336 Doing so invites a
host of negative consequences, while failing to do so has few repercussions. 337
Health care is a competitive business. Hospitals and clinics compete against one
another for revenue, patients, and the top providers. 338 When organizations are
transparent about the harms their providers inflict, they place themselves at
significant disadvantage vis-à-vis their peer institutions. 339 Since most
organizations do not report, doing so makes the organization stand out as a bad
organization instead of as an honest one. 340
To think about this problem in a different context, lack of reporting and lack
of sanctions for not reporting help explain why universities so often fail to
disclose Title IX offenses. 341 Like health care, education is a competitive field
and universities have the added challenge of convincing parents to send their
newly adult children to reside with them for four years. 342 Reporting Title IX
offenses can indicate that a university is dangerous and can motivate parents to
send their children elsewhere. 343 Universities that do not report Title IX offenses
look safer to parents, even if they have as many (or even more) offenses than
universities that report. 344
In both education and health care, uneven reporting offers some
organizations protection and allows them to capitalize on assumptions that they
are safer than their competitors. 345 Given these perverse incentives, boards must
find a way to reverse the motivations that guide the field. 346 That is, they must
find a way to make reporting the norm and not the exception. 347 If everyone
reports, the competitive advantage that comes from not reporting disappears and
hospitals and clinics will be more likely to report if failing to do so comes at a
cost. 348

335. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 28–29; McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 5–6.
336. Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 28.
337. Id.
338. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 35, at 142.
339. Yung, supra note 159, at 6.
340. Id.
341. Dunn, supra note 27, at 556; Leon, supra note 27, at 1015, 1021; Yung, supra note 159,
at 5, 7.
342. Doug Lederman, Four-Year-College Leaders Not Feeling Ready for the Future, INSIDE
HIGHER ED. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2019/10/22/
four-year-college-leaders-not-feeling-ready-future.
343. Yung, supra note 159, at 6.
344. Id.
345. See id.
346. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 112, at 149.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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The question is what kinds of costs motivate organizations to behave
differently? Pendo et al. and others, such as Patricia King of the FSMB, argue
that the threat of a fine will elicit more reporting. 349 However, making fines the
key strategy for overcoming input barriers overlooks a number of challenges.
First, organizations might simply fold the fine into the normal costs of doing
business, especially if refusing to report brought in more money than the fine
cost. 350 Second, boards have few ways of knowing if unreported wrongdoing is
occurring, making it difficult to levy a fine.
I suggest that pairing fines with other strategies will be more effective. Fines
are a material resource, and they are certainly important to organizations.
However, organizations thrive on symbolic resources as well, such as
reputation. 351 Boards can threaten the organizations’ reputations by publicly
sanctioning those that fail to report or that inadequately report. 352 They can
create grades similar to those doled out by the health department and make
reporting a key factor for determining those grades. 353 This would be especially
powerful if boards published these grades and used them to compare peer
institutions. 354 And boards can use their audit power to uncover wrongdoing that
would not otherwise come to light. Together, fines and public broadcasting of
organizations’ wrongdoing, paired with audits, are likely to convince
organizations that failing to report simply is not worth the cost. Putting these
strategies in place to increase inputs raises questions about how to improve
outputs.
C. Outputs: Standardizing Communication 355
Output barriers are fundamentally a communication problem. Boards lack
systematic ways to communicate with other boards and with law enforcement.
Developing these communication pathways could go a long way towards
stopping harm to patients.
Technology could help to improve communication among boards. Software
engineers could create systems that automatically alert a board when one of its
349. Patricia A. King et al., State Medical Board Recommendations for Stronger Approaches
to Sexual Misconduct by Physicians, 325 JAMA 1609, 1610 (2021). See Pendo et al., supra note 5,
at 27, 29 (providing model language to authorize penalties against hospitals and other entities for
failure to report); McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 13 (recommending that a board fine “hospitals
and academic medical centers for failure to report instances of egregious wrongdoing”).
350. Dorothy S. Lund & Natasha Sarin, The Cost of Doing Business: Corporate Crime and
Punishment Post-Crisis 40 (Feb. 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Carey School of Law Legal Scholarship Repository).
351. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 27, at 184–85.
352. Sharon Yadin, Regulatory Shaming, 49 ENV’T. L. 407, 415–16, 426 (2019).
353. Janet Fleetwood, Scores on Doors: Restaurant Hygiene Ratings and Public Health Policy,
40 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 410, 410–11, 415 (2019).
354. Yadin, supra note 352, at 415–16, 426.
355. NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
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licensees is under investigation by another board. This could be created through
the FSMB, who could urge boards to participate in the system. Boards would
then designate liaisons to communicate with other boards about the case and
provide the evidence they can provide within the bounds of the law. This kind
of isomorphic process would help to prevent the kind of buffering that often
occurs at the board level because it would take discretion about sharing a case
against a physician out of the hands of board members, who are likely to be
somewhat sympathetic to physicians, and instead create a systematic mechanism
for sharing cases across locales.
Boards can improve communication with law enforcement by having a law
enforcement liaison who works with criminal investigators within the bounds of
the law to share information about cases. They could also encourage law
enforcement to have designated liaisons who work with boards. Opening these
channels of communication could tamp down on the frustration and resentment
that boards and law enforcement feel towards one another and could prevent
problems like “burning” undercover investigations or refusing to share
information necessary to complete a board case. 356 Systematically linking these
organizations would likely be far more effective than the one-off interpersonal
communication that occurs now.
V. CONCLUSION
We began this symposium by asking why medical boards that have a duty
to protect the public so often fail to do so—that is, why they fail to use their
harshest punishments even in the most egregious cases. Pendo, McIntosh, and
their colleagues offer one set of answers that center on absent resources that
board members say they need to help them do a better job disciplining
physicians. 357 Based on my reading of their research findings, I am convinced
that resources matter, but I think that organizational and cultural factors have an
equal role to play. I have demonstrated three forms of barriers—input barriers,
processing barriers, and output barriers—that prevent boards from fully
disciplining physicians who impose egregious harm. Organizational tendencies
to buffer and circulate their members help explain each of these barriers—why
hospitals and clinics do not report to boards, why boards do not enact harsher
discipline, and why boards do not share information with boards in other states
and with law enforcement. 358
My framework suggests that beyond providing boards with the resources
they need, we also need to disrupt the organizational processes that prevent
disciplinary cases from moving forward and to change the incentives that
hospitals, clinics, and boards face to protect physicians. When organizations
356. Chiarello, supra note 114, at 12–13; NSF Award No. 1753308, supra note 18.
357. McIntosh et al., supra note 5, at 10–15; Pendo et al., supra note 5, at 15.
358. Chiarello & Morrill, supra note 26, at 159.
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buffer and circulate physicians instead of disciplining them, they not only fail to
punish past harm, but also help to facilitate future harm. 359 And there is no doubt
that these maneuvers fail to serve the public interest.

359. Id. at 160; Lilienthal & Mowrey, supra note 137.

